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ABSTRACT 
Work integrating conversations around AI and Disability is 
vital and valued, particularly when done through a lens of 
fairness. Yet at the same time, analyzing the ethical 
implications of AI for disabled people solely through the lens 
of a singular idea of "fairness" risks reinforcing existing 
power dynamics, either through reinforcing the position of 
existing medical gatekeepers, or promoting tools and 
techniques that benefit otherwise-privileged disabled people 
while harming those who are rendered outliers in multiple 
ways. In this paper we present two case studies from within 
computer vision - a subdiscipline of AI focused on training 
algorithms that can "see" - of technologies putatively 
intended to help disabled people but, through failures to 
consider structural injustices in their design, are likely to 
result in harms not addressed by a “fairness” framing of 
ethics. Drawing on disability studies and critical data 
science, we call on researchers into AI ethics and disability 
to move beyond simplistic notions of fairness, and towards 
notions of justice. 
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INTRODUCTION 
As machine learning becomes more ubiquitous, questions of 
AI and information ethics loom large in the public 
imagination. Much concern has been focused on promoting 
AI that results in more fair outcomes that do not discriminate 
against protected classes, such as those marginalized on the 
basis of gender and race. Yet little of that work has 
specifically investigated disability. Two notable exceptions, 
both from within the spaces of Disability Studies and 
Assistive Technology (AT), are Shari Trewin’s statement on 
“AI Fairness for People with Disabilities” [27], and the 
World Institute on Disability’s comments on AI and 
accessibility [32]. Together they argue that making disability 
explicit in discussions of AI and fairness is urgent as the 
quick, black boxed nature of automatic decision-making 
exacerbates disadvantages people with disabilities already 
endure and creates new ones. Though low representation in 
datasets is blamed, increasing representation will be complex 
given disability politics. For example, disabled people 
strategically choose whether and how to disclose their 
disabilities (if they even identify as having disabilities), 
likely leading to inconsistent datasets even when disability 
information is intentionally collected. Additionally, 
disabilities present themselves (or not) in a myriad ways, 
destabilizing (category-dependent) machine learning as an 
effective way of correctly identifying them.  
We are encouraged by the nascent engagement between 
Disability Studies, AT and AI ethics, and agree with many of 
the concerns outlined in both documents. For example, 
healthcare and employment remain out of reach for many 
disabled people despite policies that prohibit discrimination 
on the basis of disability, and we would be remis to deny 
AT’s role in increasing quality of life for some people with 
disabilities, if incremental. At the same time, “fairness”, like 
“equality” [1], is not an uncontested concept.  Ethicists have 
troubled the notion that it can produce justice in and of itself. 
A recent paper by Anna Lauren Hoffmann, for example [12], 
pointing to the way that fairness is modelled on U.S. anti-
discrimination law, surfaces the gaps and injustices a fairness 
framing remains silent on, including its failure to dismantle 
and rework structural oppression. In fact, without addressing 
the hierarchies that disadvantage people with disabilities in 
the first place, Hoffmann and disability justice activists 
argue, fairness may reproduce the discrimination it seeks to 
remedy.  Justice, on the other hand, guides recovery aimed at 
repairing past harm and may scaffold more accountable and 
responsible AI that is equitable in its handling of data as well 
as deployment (or withholding). Therefore, we argue for a 
reframing from fairness to justice when concerning AI ethics 
and disability.  
To highlight the necessity of this reframing, we present two 
case studies of AI/AT in which the application of a principle 
of fairness, while an improvement over inaction, does not 
prevent the harms that the technology opens space for. 
FAIRNESS: DEFINED AND CONTESTED 
To begin, we briefly define and critique fairness according 
to the scoped scholarship on AI, ethics and people with 
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disabilities that we use to form our arguments. Shari Trewin 
and Anna Laura Hoffmann summarise fairness as it has been 
articulated by statisticians. These articulations (as applied to 
disability) largely evaluate whether similar cases, separated 
only by the presence of disability, produce the same 
outcome. In the event there is a disparity, the system is 
considered unfair. Approaches to remedying this assume that 
a lack of fairness is a failure of implementation, and largely 
center increasing the representativeness of the data 
underlying the algorithm, and improving how the algorithm 
integrates “outliers”[29, 12]. An initial reading of fairness 
may make it seem a reasonable goal to center in algorithmic 
systems; after all, what is the problem with addressing 
disparities? 
Hoffmann delineates four primary limitations of an approach 
to the consequences of AI that centers fairness. First, fairness 
is not fair; it aims to increase the status of disadvantaged 
people without explicitly addressing how the privileges of 
more powerful people will change. Second, fairness relies on 
traits being well defined so a system can know what to do 
with them. Third, fairness historically aims to improve one 
contested identity at a time when in reality, many people are 
multiply marginalized and it is not just aspects of their 
identity but interactions among multiple facets of their 
identities and oppressive structures which produce 
systematic discrimination in different ways in different 
situations. Finally, fairness frames marginalization as 
occurring in relation to specific things, namely assumed 
desires like employment. However, much injustice is 
produced by the development of standards (both formally 
and informally) which are then applied across domains. In 
other words, someone is not marginalized when applying for 
jobs and then not. Instead, oppression is threaded through 
what they do according to predetermined norms and 
disciplinary institutions which enforce them.  In summary, 
fairness is premised on understanding how oppression 
manifests in an individual and aims to promote equality 
through the remediation of technologies. It does not question 
the structures (including those which rely on AI to surveil 
and make decisions) that allow people with disabilities to be 
disadvantaged in the first place.  
For the rest of this paper, we will present two case studies—
one on the use of AI to diagnose neurodiversity including 
autism and the second about computer vision which provides 
information for blind people. after introducing a case, we 
will overview some concerns that might be raised through a 
fairness lens and then some concerns which might be raised 
with a justice lens. Through these cases, we hope to 
concretize differences between the two lenses and 
demonstrate how justice can situate and pluralize our 
conversations on AI, ethics, and disability to address 
societal, structural oppression beyond improving automatic 
decision-making and datasets themselves. 
CASE STUDIES OF AI IN ASSISTIVE TECHNOLOGY 
AI For Diagnosis 
A body of research within computer vision attempts to create 
systems which can (using facial recognition) automatically 
diagnose certain neurodiverse states – including autism [27, 
23]. Using already-recognized and diagnosed autistic 
children, researchers rely on examining facial expressions, 
degrees of emotiveness, and repetitive behaviours to provide 
diagnostic tools, arguing that doing so would reduce the 
delay of diagnosis in a child’s life [22, 11]. 
CONCERNS RAISED THROUGH A FAIRNESS LENS 
With diagnosis, researchers are confronted with biases in the 
pre-existing framework of autism – particularly the widely-
studied gender bias in symptoms [24], and the consequential 
discrepancies in diagnostic rates [10] – and less-studied but 
firmly established biases around race and ethnicity, class and 
geography [4, 16]. Dependence on diagnostic tools which are 
based on the experiences of those already diagnosed thus 
risk replicating these biases, providing seemingly-objective 
rigor to determinations that a child presenting inconsistently 
with (white, assigned male at birth) autistic children cannot 
be autistic, and should be gatekept out of support systems.  
With a fairness metric, we might suggest diversifying 
datasets so marginalized genders and races can be correctly 
diagnosed. But this solution may not adequately consider 
what it means to have the power to diagnose, and who might 
endure what consequences as a result. 
CONCERNS RAISED THROUGH A JUSTICE LENS 
In the case of diagnostic tools for autism, we run into 
concerns around medicalization and gatekeeping: the distinct 
power that comes with diagnostic authority given the 
institutionalization of a medical model of disability into the 
power structures of society [7]. 
Tools to “help” autistic people in the model of existing 
computer vision prototypes do not just provide diagnosis – 
they also reinforce the notion that the formal diagnostic route 
is the only legitimate one for autistic existences, reinforcing 
the power that psychiatrists hold. Examinations of 
medicalization – the process by which this notion of formal 
gatekeeping becomes legitimized – have already identified it 
within autism diagnostics [31], simultaneously finding little 
validity to the diagnostic systems computer vision 
researchers are using as their baseline [28]. By adding 
technical and scientific authority to medical authority, people 
subject to medical contexts are not only not granted power, 
but are even further disempowered, with even less legitimacy 
given to the patient’s voice. Once again, fairness is not a 
solution; the issue is not one of discrimination against the 
patient for being autistic but for being a patient. Just 
outcomes in this area, in other words, require not a 
consideration of fairness but of power, and of the wider 
social context into which technical systems are placed.  
Finally, and more cut-and-dried, there is the question of what 
the consequences and implications of an autism diagnosis 
are. AI systems in this domain are built on the premise that 
  
an early diagnosis is a good outcome, that diagnosis leads to 
possibilities of treatment, support and consideration. 
Notwithstanding the already-discussed biases in who can 
access diagnosis (and how diagnostic tests are constructed), 
there are serious questions about whether an earlier diagnosis 
is a better one [25]. Rather than helping people, earlier 
diagnoses may harm them. 
Even worse consequences stem from the fact that autism is 
not “just” a diagnostic label, whatever computer vision 
researchers may think; it is a label that carries with it certain 
associations about financial cost, incapability and risk – 
associations that have led to myriad harmful behavior change 
therapies and autistic children being murdered as “mercy 
killings”[35, 19]. As Mitzi Waltz puts it, “autism = death”. 
Morally and ethically, computer vision systems to provide 
that label, if designed without attendance to the wider 
societal contexts in which autistic people live, might well be 
considered death too. 
Autism diagnosed with AI is an issue of fairness – an issue 
of the unfair treatment of autistic people – but it is not one 
that can be solved simply through examining the immediate 
algorithmic inputs and outputs of the computer vision 
system. Instead, we need a model that considers holistic, 
societal implications, and the way that technologies alter the 
life chances of those they are used by or on. 
AI For “Sight” 
Our second case concerns a  longstanding area of research – 
engaged in by AI researchers, health researchers, and HCI 
researchers – is that of using computer vision (AI that “sees”) 
to assist vision-impaired people [33, 14, 19]. Projects 
presented at ASSETS alone include haptic/vision-based 
systems for detecting and representing the emotions behind 
facial expressions [5], augmented touch for communicating 
visual information [9], facial recognition for communicating 
conversational partners’ identity [2], and object and scene 
recognition [20].  
CONCERNS RAISED THROUGH A FAIRNESS LENS 
First, we must ask: sight for whom and what gets seen? There 
is a longstanding recognition of biases within computer 
vision systems, and limitations in their ability to represent 
the complexity of the world – biases that often impact those 
already marginalized [13]. In the case of object recognition, 
for example, a recent paper demonstrates that such systems 
are developed largely in a white, western and middle-class 
context, failing to recognize common household objects that 
are more-often found in poor or non-western environments 
[8]. The centering of such systems in AT design risks further 
harm to people already marginalized within both society 
widely, and the disability community. And improving 
algorithms to recognize more genders, races and objects still 
predispose futures where surveillance technologies may be 
justified for their utility for blind people while ignoring their 
ongoing documented misuse [12, 13]. 
CONCERNS RAISED THROUGH A JUSTICE LENS 
Unlike AI for diagnosis, computer vision to help people see 
seems to put more control in the disabled users hands. They 
are not the focus of the gaze: they are gazing. But this 
inversion does not necessarily redistribute power in a 
positive fashion; it can still promote asymmetric and harmful 
power distributions. Whereas tools like a white cane assume 
the brain the analytical unit, computer vision may transfer 
such judgment to automatic decision-making. Though 
developers of many identifying  technologies clarify that 
their use is meant to support not replace human decision-
making, we know that technology is often pedestalized; that 
technological and scientific ways of “knowing” are treated 
as superior to the alternative, and frequently deferred to even 
in the presence of contradictory information or assumed to 
be far more accurate than they are [15]. The result is that a 
computer vision system for accessibility, while rendering 
things more accessible, does so by shifting the center of 
analysis and judgment away from the user and towards the 
(frequently expensive, black-boxed and commercially 
shaped) technology in hand. 
Finally, computer vision, even deployed fairly, cements 
vision as a superior sense and legitimizes surveillance. Much 
research, including that cited to inform AI for accessibility, 
acknowledge and even praise nonvisual sensemaking. 
Accessibility researchers hardly advocate substituting this 
knowledge with technology. Yet these gestures would be 
more substantive if the same rigor and enthusiasm were 
applied to the development of technologies which train in or 
privilege nonvisual sensemaking [34]. Next, surveillance 
technologies are controversial, and disability studies scholars 
have critiqued the ubiquity and inaccuracy of technology 
savior narratives which hail automation for increasing the 
quality of life of people with disabilities [30]. Here we risk 
glorifying surveillance without questioning its misuse. How 
could technology to assist a blind person be kept from 
integration into policing technologies; who’s to say blind 
people aren’t among the users of policing technologies? 
Instead, until significant work is done to correct and nuance 
stories about disability, those who question using 
surveillance technologies even when used for the purposes 
of assisting disabled people may be shamed [21]. 
These are not issues that notions of “fairness” can surface, 
articulate and tackle, because the issue is not only that 
disabled sub-populations may be treated unequally between 
each other or compared to normative society, but that the 
technologies’ model of liberation is liberation without 
challenging wider structures of power. 
CONCLUSION 
We have presented two case studies of AI interventions in 
disabled lives, and the issues they raise around and with 
fairness. As we have made clear, we believe that fairness – a 
concept already being shifted away from in critical data 
studies – is highly dangerous for conversations around 
disability and AI to center. Rather, we advocate that 
  
everyone interested in questions of disability and AI 
critically examine the overarching social structures we are 
participating in, upholding and creating anew with our work. 
Doing so requires and results in a centering of our work not 
on questions of fairness, but on questions of justice [12]. 
There are many places to draw from in doing that. technology 
has always been a part of the construction of disability, and 
of the nature of disabled lives. Consequently, Disability 
Studies has long-considered questions of technology, and 
continues to do so. Just as Mankoff et al. urged the 
integration of disability studies into assistive technology 
[17], we urge a similar integration of AI and Disability 
conversations with Disability Studies conversations around 
technology, justice and power – conversations that are 
already taking place [3].  
Similarly, though disability alone leads to unique life 
experiences and oppression, there is myriad scholarship on 
AI and black lives, trans lives, poor lives – and many of those 
lives are disabled lives, too. As such, it is imperative that 
efforts concerning just  developments and deployments of AI  
for people with disabilities center multiply marginalized 
disabled people, or we risk only helping the most privileged. 
Additionally, we need to carve out space in AI ethics 
programs which are not considering disability, calling in the 
disability forgetting that has gone on in many purportedly 
justice-oriented conversations. AI is new – but the systems 
of oppression that give rise to disability are very, very old. 
They will not be unraveled piecemeal, or separate from 
recognizing and reckoning with the structural inequalities 
that have made unjust AI possible.  
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